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Introduction
We stand before unprecedented opportunity to 
improve the lives of hundreds of millions of people 
in emerging markets.
Powerful trends—from the rapid spread of mobile phones to growing middle classes, from the global uptick in 
entrepreneurship to the increased flow of capital toward developing economies—have made possible commercial 
innovations serving populations once excluded from market access. Consider: alternative credit scores to allow those 
who can’t get traditional bank loans to invest for the future; affordable solar lighting to enable children without reliable 
electricity to study at night; job-matching marketplaces accessed on a mobile phone that allow workers in informal 
markets to connect to better employment opportunities. Individually, such innovations can tangibly improve the 
lives and futures of hundreds of millions of low- and lower-middle-income people across developing and emerging 
economies. Collectively, they have the potential to create new industries and accelerate economic growth. 
But these innovations, which are frequently early stage and which often operate in more challenging markets, require 
highly risk-tolerant capital. After all, the entrepreneurs behind these companies are often attempting to build entirely 
new business models, to serve consumers coming into the formal economy for the first time, and to do so under 
variable and sometimes volatile macro-conditions. Not surprisingly, but sadly, there is far too little such capital 
currently available. 
There is, of course, plenty of later stage capital available in emerging markets for business models that are already 
demonstrated to work—for example, companies that replicate successful startups from mature economies. Limited 
available early stage capital has generally been directed to services and products serving the middle- (and often 
upper-middle-) income groups and above. Conversely, much has been written in business and development circles 
about serving the very bottom of the pyramid—the poorest socioeconomic group, which represents a large part of 
the global population. 
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This report outlines the importance and promise 
of serving low- and lower-middle-income (LMI) 
populations—essentially, the groups situated 
between the very bottom of the pyramid and the 
existing middle class. As we detail herein, LMI 
populations have huge unmet needs and face  
quite a bit of instability—challenges that can be 
addressed by innovative business models. We  
believe companies serving this demographic 
represent an under-tapped opportunity, both for 
financial returns and for outsized impact. The LMI 
segment represents a major market opportunity.  
For example, in Latin America and the Caribbean, the 
purchasing power of the LMI population is estimated 
at $405B. In South Asia, it is estimated at $483B.1
We call investments in businesses serving these populations “Frontier Capital.” Such investments are gaining a 
diverse set of champions (as detailed herein), including commercial venture capitalists, impact investors, and some of 
the world’s most successful businesspeople. Our goal in this paper is twofold. First, we sound a clarion call for more 
risk capital to support innovation to improve the lives of LMI populations in emerging markets. Second, we answer the 
related question: What types of risk capital are most appropriate for this purpose?
Both issues are of utmost importance. In recent decades, we’ve seen how risk capital can transform billions of 
lives. Venture capital (VC), perhaps the most well-known form of risk capital, has helped scale life-saving drugs and 
vaccines, facilitated access to the world’s knowledge through the Internet, and empowered activists to accelerate 
major civil rights advances through access to social media tools. Other forms of risk capital, such as philanthropic 
funding, have also made a dent—yielding advances as diverse as the green revolution, public libraries, and the 911 
emergency calling system.
Which brings us to the significance of the right type of risk capital. Entrepreneurs serving poorer populations in 
emerging markets face a variety of challenges that are less common in richer countries—from dysfunctions in 
banking systems to lack of “friends and family” funding to get new businesses kick-started to challenges in seeking 
traditional “exits” (including acquisition or IPOs). Traditional venture capital structures typically require very specific 
portfolio economics, including a five-to-seven year time horizon for companies to be acquired or to complete their 
IPO, as well as the expectation of “home runs” (investments with 10x plus returns) to make up for the high failure rate 
of startups. Such speed and scale can be challenging in less-developed markets, as can exits themselves.
But the heart of early stage risk capital is something more essential than the specific venture capital formula. It’s 
about taking a small bet on an untested idea—and increasing that bet as we see increasing evidence of its traction. 
We firmly believe this practice holds broad application for the opportunity at hand. 
Segmenting the Opportunity
In this paper we draw on 10 years and $850 million of 
funding experience—including $400 million concentrated in 
early stage investing in emerging markets.2 We also draw 
upon the experiences of our colleagues and co-investors 
in this growing movement, poring over hundreds of specific 
investment data points, as well as direct interviews and 
literature review. This exploration has affirmed the promise 
of frontier investing as both a strong business opportunity 
and an opportunity to transform lives. It also points to the 
importance of segmenting the frontier opportunity in terms 
of tools and investment expectations. 
We divide the frontier capital opportunity into three 
segments: 1) “replicate and adapt” (proven business 
models, where the bulk of existing VC money is already 
flowing); 2) “frontier” (unproven business models that 
are asset light and serve both lower- and middle-income 
populations; this segment represents under-tapped 
opportunity that can be unlocked using conventional VC 
structures); and 3) “frontier plus” (unproven business 
models that may be asset intensive, serve only lower-
income groups, and/or operate in countries with less-
developed capital markets; this segment requires investors 
to be more creative with the tools they use, but offers 
tremendous impact potential).
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As the graphic above illustrates, as we 
move farther out from known business 
models, the higher the risk and the 
scarcer existing capital become—
but the potential becomes greater 
for outsized impact in the form of 
innovation to meet the needs of LMI 
populations. It follows, then, that each 
of these segments is most appropriate 
for a different set of actors and 
requires a different set of tools. 
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SEGMENT STATUS DESCRIPTION CALL TO ACTION KEY ACTORS
REPLICATE  
AND ADAPT
“GREEN PASTURES”
Much investment 
activity and  
strong results
Proven business 
models: de-risked 
elsewhere, adapted  
to emerging  
markets context
Track newly  
de-risked frontier 
and frontier plus 
models and be ready 
to replicate them; 
expand the reach of 
proven models into 
LMI segments
Commercial 
VCs in Emerging 
Markets
FRONTIER
“GREEN SHOOTS” 
Strong companies 
attracting good 
investor base but still 
untapped potential
Unproven business 
models that are asset 
light and target a 
mixed-income base 
More to be done 
here (through use 
of traditional VC 
funding structures) to 
accelerate promising 
verticals, including 
fintech, edtech, and 
consumer Internet 
and mobile
Commercial 
VCs, Impact 
Investors, DFIs, 
High Net Worth 
Individuals
FRONTIER  
PLUS
“SEEDS” 
Promising companies 
and business models, 
many at very early 
stages of testing
Unproven business 
models that are 
also one or more of 
the following: asset 
intensive; serving 
only lower-income 
customers; operating 
in a country with 
under-developed 
capital market
Pioneer investors 
needed to de-risk 
these newer models 
and provide better 
data on track record; 
in this domain 
consider innovations  
beyond traditional  
VC funding
Impact 
Investors,  
High Net Worth 
Individuals,  
DFIs, and  
other mission-
aligned groups
Take, for example, the replicate and adapt segment, where de-risking and proof of concept were done elsewhere, 
usually with someone else’s money, and imported into an emerging markets context (or imported from one emerging 
market to another). Since these businesses involve less trial and error—and more predictable returns—it is not 
surprising that this domain is where the bulk of existing venture capital money in emerging markets is concentrated. 
While most of these proven models still serve only middle and upper-middle classes, there are a growing number with 
relevance to lower-income groups—from merchant cash advance to e-commerce models targeting mass markets, 
which we detail herein. 
Things get trickier, but also potentially more compelling, when we turn to unproven models serving lower-income 
customers. The second segment, which we call the frontier, has tremendous untapped potential that can be 
unlocked largely with the traditional VC financing tools. In the frontier, businesses tend to be asset light (and do not 
generally include, for example, companies that have large real estate costs or inventory needs). This is particularly 
important since less financing is readily available for unproven business models in emerging markets. These 
companies also aim to address larger markets, not only serving the poor but simultaneously addressing the needs of 
consumers one or two income tiers up (lower-middle and middle income)—a strategy we call a “mixed income.” The 
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frontier segment includes promising sectors such as financial 
technology, education technology, and innovations in consumer 
Internet and mobile—areas that are already showing strong 
results. The frontier is a segment with great potential for both 
conventional VCs as well as impact investors (and their limited 
partners [LPs]). Notably, we find that companies in the frontier 
tend to operate in the more developed capital markets in the 
global south—such as Brazil, Mexico, India, and the like. 
The third segment is what we call frontier plus. These are 
companies that not only have unproven business models but 
also take on additional challenges: They may target smaller 
markets with only poorer income segments; they may be more 
asset intensive; and/or they may operate in geographies where 
exits are particularly challenging. Here, we need to be creative 
in our pursuit of pushing the boundaries. There are indeed great 
businesses that fall into this category; in fact, this may be where 
some of the most innovative business models lie. But it would not be wise to rely solely on the traditional VC fund 
structure. Instead, we recommend experimenting with a variety of innovations for a more appropriate form of risk 
capital—including longer time horizons and various forms of quasi-equity, as well as the provision of more affordable 
forms of venture debt. Perhaps most importantly, here is where we need truly risk-tolerant capital—investors who are 
willing to take big bets in service of opening up entirely new industry sectors with transformative impact. Here we 
see a huge role for impact investors and their LPs as well, particularly for high net worth individuals who have great 
appetite to take risks and do things differently in service of outsized impact. 
Things get trickier, but also 
potentially more compelling, 
when we turn to unproven models 
serving lower-income customers. 
The second segment, which we 
call the frontier, has tremendous 
untapped potential that can 
be unlocked largely with the 
traditional VC financing tools. 
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VCs: A growing number of conventional 
venture capitalists are backing new 
business opportunities in emerging 
markets created by expanding low- and lower-
middle-income populations and rapid technology 
adoption and innovation. Investors such as 
Sequoia, Matrix, and KaszeK have invested in 
businesses in regions such as India, Latin America, 
and China.
Impact investors: Committed to both 
financial and social returns, impact 
investors have been at the forefront 
of proving new business models in emerging 
markets with the explicit goal of creating massive 
social impact. Groups such as Bamboo Finance, 
Accion’s Frontier Investments Group, Elevar, 
and LGT Venture Philanthropy are supporting 
entrepreneurs in over 30 emerging markets, 
from Colombia to South Africa. In Mexico, IGNIA 
supports enterprises serving base of the pyramid 
customers. In India, funds such as Lok Capital and 
Unitus Seed Fund are funding innovations in areas 
such as healthcare, education, e-commerce, and 
financial services. Fund managers, such as those 
listed above, are backed by a diverse set of LPs, 
including major financial institutions, foundations, 
religious groups, and DFIs (per below). 
HNWs: Increasingly, high net worth 
individuals are looking to apply their 
business acumen to solving some of 
the world’s toughest problems. Highly successful 
business leaders such as Michael Bloomberg, 
Stephen Brenninkmeijer, Desh Deshpande, 
Tony Elumelu, Bill Gates, Vinod Khosla, Pierre 
Omidyar, and Mark Zuckerberg have invested in 
frontier companies and funds in sectors such as 
healthcare, education, and solar energy.
DFIs: Development finance institutions 
have played a key role in providing debt 
and equity financing to enterprises in 
emerging markets for development purposes. In 
recent years, we have seen organizations such 
as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC), CDC, IFC, FMO, and the Inter-American 
Development Bank explore new ways to direct 
early stage capital to businesses serving low-
income populations in emerging markets. With the 
backing of the US, UK, Swedish, and Australian 
governments, the Global Innovation Fund was 
launched in 2014 to support innovations in 
emerging markets that have a strong potential for 
social impact using a venture capital-like approach. 
The UK Department for International Development 
(DFID) launched a £75m fund to support 
businesses in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia 
that have a positive impact on poorer populations.
Governments: In emerging markets, 
there has been an uptick in government 
programs and policies aimed at 
fostering entrepreneurial ecosystems and early 
stage investing. The government of India has 
been particularly active in this regard; it recently 
launched a number of measures including the India 
Aspiration Fund (a fund of funds for early stage 
companies), which also encourages investors to 
pursue new investment theses. Longer-standing 
programs include the likes of Colombia’s iNNpulsa, 
Brazil’s FINAR and Criatec Fund, and Mexico’s 
INADEM and NAFIN.
Entrepreneurs: At the heart of the 
frontier capital movement are the 
entrepreneurs creating products and 
services to improve the lives of lower-income 
customers. While these entrepreneurs operate in 
environments that pose a unique set of risks, many 
are successfully overcoming these barriers to serve 
millions of people. A number of these examples 
are profiled herein—from Dailyhunt (founded 
by Virendra Gupta), which enables non-English 
speakers in India to access critical news and 
information via the mobile Internet, to MicroEnsure 
(founded by Richard Leftley), which offers 
affordable life and health insurance to low-income 
customers in Africa and Asia. 
The Frontier Capital movement is attracting champions from a diverse set of players. Influential business 
leaders, traditional venture capitalists, impact investors, development finance institutions, and government 
policy all play a role in helping direct risk capital toward innovations in a wide array of sectors. 
The Frontier Capital Movement
Page 9
Before we dive into the heart of the paper, several clarifications 
are in order. First, our analysis is limited to businesses serving 
low- and lower-middle-income groups (which we shorthand as 
“LMI populations”), but not those serving the extreme poor or 
the very bottom of the pyramid. We explain the rationale for this 
in the text box on the right.
Second, while this paper is “supply side” focused (looking 
at variations in financing for early stage businesses), the 
“demand side” is critical to this equation. Indeed, the quality of 
entrepreneurs and their management teams may be the single 
most important factor determining the potential success of a 
startup—a topic on which much has already been written.5
Third, while this essay is about emerging markets, some of the 
lessons and analysis (especially those around more patient 
financing models for companies in the frontier plus category) 
might be more broadly applicable—for example to companies 
serving poorer populations in richer countries, or those  
tackling tough problems that simply don’t lend themselves  
to a conventional venture approach. 
Last, this essay is intended to spark an important conversation, 
rather than to serve as the last word on the topic. We welcome 
debate and dialogue. We write because we believe that 
expanding opportunity for lower-income segments is both an 
urgent need and a strong, untapped business opportunity. 
We write because we want to reflect on our own experience of 
these markets—and the sometimes difficult, but often inspiring, 
lessons of our own portfolio. And, most of all, we write out of 
a combination of humility and urgency; we want to learn from 
everyone who has ideas and hard-fought lessons that can help 
all of us do this more quickly and with more impact. We are 
hoping to find more leaders and investors who are willing to take 
risks to make sure we don’t squander this opportunity.
The Importance of Serving  
LMI Populations
Even at this ripe moment, there are limits to the 
reach of market-based solutions. It has been 
well-established that many businesses have a 
hard time serving the poorest of the poor without 
subsidy.3 While it is urgent that these groups are 
served, it may well be the case that permanent 
subsidy in the form of grants, public spending 
(e.g., social safety nets or cash transfers), or 
concessionary investing is the primary avenue by 
which this will take place. Instead, in this paper, 
we are deliberately focusing more narrowly on 
the income tiers just above the very bottom of 
the pyramid. Definitions of income tiers vary from 
geography to geography (and indeed translate 
very differently in urban vs. rural areas), but if 
the very bottom of the pyramid earns less than 
$2/day, then we are collectively defining “low- 
and lower-middle-income populations” as the 
population that earns roughly between $2 and 
$8/day (including 
both low-income 
groups earning 
$2-5/day and 
lower-middle-
income groups 
earning $5-8/day). 
People in low- and lower-middle-income 
segments have greater purchasing power 
and often steadier income streams than the 
very bottom of the pyramid, making building 
businesses to serve them a much more viable 
prospect. Many of them are already accustomed 
to buying their services from private entities, and 
indeed may prefer to do so, especially in urban 
areas. But they are still highly vulnerable in the 
absence of safety nets, and highly in need of 
innovations that can help them improve their lives. 
For example, families that earn just $5/day face 
up to a 40% chance of falling below the poverty 
line within 3-5 years, a risk that drops to 10% only 
when families earn above $10/day.4 Serving this 
group is therefore both important from an impact 
perspective and feasible from a business one. 
BOP: LESS THAN $2/DAY
HIGHER-
INCOME
EARNERS
LMI: $2-8/DAY
Returns on the Frontier
We are beginning to see promising track records for excellent fund managers serving LMI populations 
in emerging markets. Many are existing emerging markets VC funds—including well-known names such 
as KaszeK, Matrix, and Sequoia. But a new crop of funds has set out with the explicit purpose of serving 
lower-income groups. Some, like Accion’s Frontier Investments Group, focus in a specific sector such as 
financial inclusion. Others, like the ones below, source from different sectors. Notably, the funds below 
each include a mix of investees from the replicate and adapt, frontier, and frontier plus segments. 
For example, Elevar Equity is a venture fund focused on serving low-income customers in India and  
Latin America through investments in financial inclusion, housing, education, and healthcare. Elevar’s first 
$24 million fund invested in seven companies and has had complete or partial exits from four companies. 
The realized fund IRR to date is 72% on a local currency basis (Indian rupee, Mexican peso, and Brazilian 
real), 62% on a USD basis, and the net realized IRR to investors in dollar terms to date is 23%. 
Similarly, Aavishkaar, a seed stage firm focused in lower-income segments primarily in India’s 
underserved regions, has invested in a number of capital-intensive businesses in agriculture, dairy, 
education, energy, and health among others—some in the proven business model domain and some in 
the frontier and frontier plus categories. Aavishkaar has had 15 profitable exits from the 48 companies it 
backed in the last 12 years and a 2.9x return on invested capital, with all exits to private equity investors. 
Inherent to their approach is moving the investment risk from technology and product innovation to 
innovation in execution and a redefinition of the parameters of blockbuster success—“a return of 5 to  
10 times of invested capital, instead of a return of 100 times.”6
Lok Capital is a venture fund focused on serving the lower-income segment in India, primarily through 
investments in financial inclusion, livelihood, healthcare, and education—with a mix of proven models 
(such as microfinance), frontier models (technology enabled, mixed income), as well as frontier plus 
models. Its first $22 million fund invested in 10 companies and the fund is now nearly fully liquidated  
from its portfolio. Exits returned 170% of capital invested and individual IRRs ranged from 25 to 30%.
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We begin our exploration of the frontier opportunity with a brief look at a 
segment we call “Replicate and Adapt.” This domain is comprised of business 
models that have been proven elsewhere, often with someone else’s money, 
and then replicated and adapted to an emerging markets context. 
Such businesses constitute the bulk of emerging markets venture capital to date. Witness, for example, Rocket 
Internet—perhaps the best-known VC fund that takes proven technology business models from the West—such as 
those of Amazon and Zappos, and replicates them in emerging markets. While most businesses in the proven models 
segment serve middle-income populations and above, there is a growing subset that serves low- and lower-middle-
income populations.
For example, preschool chains are a proven business model in the United States and elsewhere (with well-
documented benefits for early childhood education)—but not yet established in emerging markets. Tree House, the 
market leader for preschool in India, received early venture capital support from Matrix and others, and has scaled 
1  Replicate and Adapt 
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rapidly. As of June 2015, Tree House had 647 preschools in 97 cities across India.7 The company serves not only 
middle- and higher-income groups but also lower-middle ones. Similarly, Tappsi in Colombia, which provides on-
demand taxi services, builds off of the existing track record of Uber in the United States to bring this new service 
to Latin America. Since taxi drivers come from mostly lower- and middle-income groups in emerging markets, this 
model allows workers to tap into bigger clientele bases. 
There are also a variety of models here that are more straight technology plays—for example, merchant cash 
advance (which allows “mom and pop” owners of bodegas and small businesses to smooth out cash flow bumps), 
online classifieds and job-matching sites (which allow low-income workers to access a broader set of employment 
opportunities) and the like. 
Notably, we are beginning to see proven 
models targeting only lower-income 
groups. For example, microfinance was 
intentionally created to serve the poor 
in emerging markets—and benefited 
from decades of patient financing 
and subsidy. Once the model was 
proven, however, it spread rapidly, 
gained commercial funding, and 
created notable exits for companies 
such as Compartamos in Mexico and 
SKS in India. (While microfinance 
institutions were predominantly debt-
funded, SKS and Compartamos did 
receive VC equity as well.) We are 
also beginning to see some examples 
of “homegrown” or south-south 
adaptation, such as M-PESA, which 
was de-risked in Kenya and replicated 
in other emerging markets.  
What unites businesses in the “replicate 
and adapt” segment is that the de-risking 
and proof of concept were achieved 
elsewhere with someone else’s money. Since these companies have much more predictable returns—and involve far 
less trial and error than their “frontier” counterparts, there is typically much more financing available to them. This 
means such businesses can take on a wider variety of characteristics and still scale rapidly. For example, Tree House, 
which supports a chain of school locations—requires substantial physical infrastructure. Access to finance for such 
needs has not proven an obstacle since both investors have confidence, and indeed proof, that the business model 
itself is viable.
Given the above, it is no surprise that proven models are where most VCs in emerging markets situate themselves. 
And there is certainly untapped potential here to extend proven models to serve LMI populations. This domain is also 
competitive and crowded. Further, only concentrating here may put investors at risk of missing the next promising 
waves of investment opportunities, with innovations targeted specifically at these populations and their needs. 
In the “Replicate and Adapt” segment, there have 
been several notable exits in the microfinance sector. 
Below are some of the companies that both delivered 
impactful financial services to low- and lower-middle-
income populations and produced 5X or greater returns 
to their investors. 
COMPANY COUNTRY
Compartamos Mexico
Equitas Micro Finance India India
Equity Bank Kenya
Janalakshmi Financial Services India
MiBanco Peru
SKS Microfinance India
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If proven models are where most VC money is now playing, unproven models 
represent both underappreciated opportunity and greater risk. It is in 
this domain that we believe investors will find the biggest possibilities for 
innovation and impact targeted at unmet needs of lower-income groups. 
It is also in this domain that investors have a chance to reap the benefits of being earlier to market, and developing 
local knowledge and networks. But this comes with less certainty about which businesses and models can be 
successful, which makes it doubly important to distinguish what types of unproven models are ripe for existing  
VC funding (and particularly the traditional “2 and 20” closed-end fund), and which we may need to think about  
more creatively. 
As a general rule, early stage investors look at size of market and size of margins as two key factors that  
determine the suitability of a business for venture funding. These two factors are true regardless of the geography  
in which an investor operates. Our experience with the unique challenges of emerging markets and LMI populations 
led us to identify additional key business model factors that help distinguish where and when conventional VC 
structures are applicable. 
The first is around the segment (and therefore size) of the market being pursued. Generally, companies that pursue a 
“mixed income” strategy–a mass market strategy serving both middle- and lower-income populations–have a better 
chance of scaling quickly and profitably. The second factor is around asset intensity: Since less financing is generally 
available to unproven emerging markets businesses, those that have lesser needs for working capital, physical 
infrastructure and the like, will generally have a stronger chance of creating the kind of home runs necessary for VC 
portfolios because time to scale will be much more rapid. It follows that investors in asset light models do not face 
as much potential dilution as the company grows. Finally, we also note as a consideration (separate from any specific 
business model question) the maturity of the capital market in which the company is being funded. As detailed herein, 
startups in certain countries have better prospects for exits than others. 
Of course, this analysis is not meant to be exhaustive or exclusive; there may indeed be businesses that don’t meet 
these criteria and still make for great venture investments. The discussion is meant to be directional, to provoke a 
conversation that helps distinguish nearer-term opportunities from those that require more vision and risk tolerance.
2  The Frontier 
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Factor One: “Mixed-Income” Models
The larger your target market, the easier it is to achieve the classic “J-curve” growth that enables more rapid scale 
and the possibility of a “home run” (10x plus) VC return. This insight is hardly new. But when applied to businesses 
targeting LMI populations, it has important implications. Specifically, it may be far easier to achieve scale and 
to reach more lower-income consumers when you also serve middle-income customers—rather than focusing 
exclusively on lower-income segments as many well-intentioned investors frequently do. 
We call business models that simultaneously serve LMI as well as middle-income populations “mixed-income 
models.” As outlined below, these models have several advantages that often enable them to grow more quickly 
than businesses serving solely lower-income customers. Such an argument may be uncomfortable for those 
who are exclusively focused on the needs of the poor. While the needs of the lower-middle class may not be as 
dramatic as those of lower-income groups, they are still important; addressing them may provide means to develop 
commercially viable channels to ultimately reach those with the most need. Of course, in many countries, low-
income groups are such a large percentage of the population that it is almost a prerequisite for success to serve 
both lower- and middle-income populations simultaneously. 
The Low- and Lower-Middle-Income Opportunity
There is a massive opportunity for businesses serving low- and lower-middle-income segments. 
Greater purchasing power and steadier income streams makes building businesses to serve these 
populations more viable. As the below graphs demonstrate, purchasing power of the low-income 
segment* is approximately 60% more than that of the lowest income segment, despite having half  
the population.
Total Consumption = 9,622B
Billions PPP$
Total Population = 5,219M 
3,070B
LOW 
$3-8.4 per day
1,928B
LOWEST 
below $3 per day
3,117B
MIDDLE 
$8.4-23 per day
1,505B HIGH $23 per day
1,508M
3,017M
600M
93M
LOW 
$3-8.4 per day
LOWEST 
below $3 per day
MIDDLE 
$8.4-23 per day
HIGH 
$23 per day
Source: Global Consumption Database, World Bank / IFC
*While we use the $2-8/day threshold for this paper to define LMI, the data source above uses a slightly different cut ($3-8.40/day)
ECONOMIES OF SCALE
Mixed-income businesses generally target significantly larger 
markets. Indeed, compared to businesses that only serve 
low-income populations, mixed-income businesses can often 
achieve a greater volume of customers more easily, which in turn 
drives down costs and, usually, prices. Lower prices, of course, 
put products and services within the reach of the poor and help 
drive additional volume.
For example, Ver de Verdad (funded by IGNIA) identified a 
massive, underserved market in Mexico: those who need eye 
exams and high-quality, affordable eyeglasses. The company 
aggressively targeted a mass market, locating stores in 
downtown city centers with high foot traffic from both middle 
class and low-income customers. The high volume of customers 
created economies of scale that drove down the price—key to 
serving low-income customers. The high volume also justified an 
in-house beveling machine that could deliver the newly minted 
eyeglasses in just 45 minutes—a unique value proposition 
attractive to customers across all segments. Ver de Verdad 
currently has 23 clinics open, with the expectation of reaching 
over 300 by 2020. 
Another example comes from microfinance. An internal look 
at MIX Market data suggested that newer for-profit MFIs with 
a lower proportion of clients below the poverty line (indicating 
they target mixed-income segments) tend to generate greater 
returns.10 This makes sense, as a number of MFIs who have 
exclusively targeted low-income consumers have a very difficult 
time covering their costs, due to a range of issues including 
cost to reach and agent costs.11 In general, those who have 
been concerned about microfinance reaching the poorest have 
recognized this phenomenon—leaders at microcredit pioneer 
BRAC confirmed this finding in a recent Harvard Business 
Review article.12 Ford Foundation’s microfinance program has 
also responded to this realization, and in recent years has 
focused more on social performance measurement support 
for MFIs, and on working with CGAP and other researchers to 
promote and investigate the “graduation” model for the lowest-
income families.13 The effect of this focus has been positive for 
the poorest households. Evaluations of the Graduation Program 
by J-PAL and IPA showed that microfinance services have been 
most effective in improving the well-being of clients living below 
the poverty line when paired with other subsidized services such 
as a business asset (like livestock), regular cash or food support, 
access to a savings account, and training/coaching services.14
Scale Is Rare in Serving the  
Poor Exclusively
Studies by Monitor Inclusive Markets of 
(collectively) 700+ ventures in more than a 
dozen sectors in India and nine countries in 
Africa found the most successful enterprises—
i.e., those that had achieved some level of 
commercial viability and scale (whether in 
education, health, agriculture, financial services, 
water, and beyond)—buffered the risk and 
volatility of serving the poor by expanding their 
customer base to include adjacent and modestly 
higher income brackets.8 Doing so, one study 
found, “proved to be a powerful risk mitigation 
tool” against high default rates or the periodic 
inability to purchase that can severely impact 
revenue, financial reserves, and the speed of 
scale.9 Notably, of all the ventures in these 
studies serving low-income segments at scale in 
India and Africa, nearly every single VC-backed 
company targeted mixed-income markets. 
Examples included Vaatsalya Hospitals (India), 
Servals Automation (India), Livewell Clinics (now 
Viva Afya, Kenya), SKS Microfinance (India), 
Spandana (India), and d.light (India and Africa).
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ECONOMIES OF SCOPE 
Mixed-income businesses are also often able to utilize existing infrastructure to add lower-price products onto 
existing lines, thus increasing overall profits. 
Take, for example, the South African healthcare company CareCross. Whereas Ver de Verdad targeted a mass market 
from day one, CareCross started upmarket: In its first decade CareCross grew to serve more than 1 million middle- 
and upper-income South Africans. To attract low-income customers, CareCross designed a new product at a lower 
price point and developed innovative new marketing techniques for a target market unfamiliar with prepaid healthcare 
subscriptions. In four years, CareCross proved it could serve this new market segment profitably without subsidy 
by leveraging existing business units—allowing the company to drive down “startup” costs and minimize execution 
risk. With the help of like-minded investors such as Bamboo Finance, the company aggressively grew its low-income 
customer base. Its success in this arena contributed to a successful exit; CareCross was acquired by MMI, a South 
African Insurance Group, in 2014. 
EARLY ADOPTERS TO KICK-START GROWTH
In addition to economies of scale and scope, mixed-income models are more likely to gain early adopters to kick-
start their initial growth. Poorer customers are generally more risk averse when it comes to adopting new innovations 
or technologies—and with good reason. Smaller wallets put greater pressure on every penny (or rupee or peso) spent 
to be put to good use. Some companies may more easily be able to acquire the early adopters so necessary for 
proving their business model by looking for them in the middle class. Once traction has been gained in these groups, 
it is often easier to convince more income-constrained customers to come on board. 
Take, for example, M-PESA, a well-known development 
story with unexpected origins. M-PESA is a disruptive 
financial service that launched in 2007 and rocketed to 12 
million+ active customers by 2014, more than half the adult 
population of Kenya.15 By 2011, 72% of the M-PESA fast-
growing customer base lived outside Nairobi on less than 
$1.25 per day.16 Despite the tremendous benefit reaped from 
M-PESA by low-income, rural, and unbanked households, 
they were not among its early adopters.17 Safaricom first 
marketed M-PESA to the young, urban middle class. A 2008 
survey confirmed that when M-PESA was not yet two years 
old, its early adopters were largely tech-savvy, banked, 
educated customers with significant discretionary income.18 
The M-PESA early adopters forged an aspirational brand and 
achieved critical mass to fuel network effects as M-PESA 
scaled to a mass market, with a heavy percentage of lower-
income customers.19
IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTORS
The above analysis illustrates that early stage investments 
in LMI markets are more likely to hit fast-growth targets by 
supporting businesses pursuing mixed-income customer 
strategies. Investors would be well-served to look for more 
models that benefit from such economies of scale and scope. 
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This analysis illustrates that early 
stage investments in LMI markets 
are more likely to hit fast-growth 
targets by supporting businesses 
pursuing mixed-income customer 
strategies. Investors would be well-
served to look for more models 
that benefit from such economies 
of scale and scope. While it may 
be counterintuitive, some of the 
best opportunities to serve lower-
income populations at scale may 
well come in the form of mass-
market businesses. 
While it may be counterintuitive, some of the best opportunities to serve lower-income populations at scale may well 
come in the form of mass-market businesses. Indeed, some of these businesses may start without any obvious plan 
in the beginning to pursue down-market expansion, as we saw with the case of CareCross. 
But that does not mean that mixed-income models are a panacea. Indeed, not all startups that successfully serve 
the middle class can successfully expand down-market.20 Some that do end up sacrificing the quality of the product. 
Others may end up forgoing opportunities to target lower-income customers for fear of cannibalizing higher-margin 
businesses. Indeed, we have seen several companies abandoning plans to move down-market once they saw the 
comparative difficulties and risks of doing so, or simply the size and appeal of the opportunity to keep pursuing in 
more purely middle class segments. 
Moreover, there are some services that poorer populations need that cannot be addressed by mixed-income models. 
Such services are important and none of the analysis above is meant to suggest otherwise. For example, Omidyar 
Network is a proud supporter of Living Goods, a nonprofit employing market-based approaches to provide life-saving 
health products to the poor in East Africa through local sales agents. This group had a choice to improve operating 
revenue by moving toward higher-income groups in urban areas and higher-margin products, but found rigorous 
evidence that their existing model reduced maternal mortality by an impressive 25 percent among the lowest-income 
populations. Such impact would likely have been lost with a switch to higher-income customers. Indeed, it is this risk 
that impact investors often refer to as “mission drift.” 
Investors worried about mission drift can significantly mitigate such risks by investing in companies where social 
impact is embedded in the business model. For example, a company like d.light, which creates solar lanterns 
for those without reliable electricity access can serve many low- and lower-middle-income segments with these 
products; the products themselves are less relevant to upper-income populations, who have more options for lighting. 
Page 18
Factor Two: Asset Light
The second major factor that we have observed in achieving the speed and magnitude of scale for businesses 
targeting lower-income customers is around the level of assets required, especially at startup stage. While the term 
“asset light” has many connotations, we use it primarily to denote companies that require relatively little capital 
expenditure (for example, for physical infrastructure or equipment) or working capital to prove a model and expand—
which is particularly true of many technology companies. Compared to traditional businesses, whose growth is 
supported by increases in inventories and accounts receivable, or by physical infrastructure, asset light technology 
businesses may be able to test and adapt their business model more cheaply and quickly. Similarly, once the 
business model is de-risked, they can scale their model much more cost-effectively and quickly and are far more 
likely to have the kind of non-linear scale that makes for home runs. Distribution, sales, and marketing can frequently 
be expanded via low-cost electronic means rather than high-cost logistics, physical infrastructure, and assets. 
Compare, for example, the timelines to scale of some of today’s 
biggest tech companies. Google, Facebook, and Amazon all 
relied on an established low marginal cost infrastructure of the 
Internet in order to scale. Then consider similar timelines for 
highly successful brick-and-mortar-based companies such as 
Wal-Mart and Chipotle. While the tech giants scaled almost 
solely online, the latter scaled through physical presences 
built store by store around the world. Amazon, Google, 
and Facebook took six, five, and five years respectively 
from their founding until they reached a billion dollars in 
revenue. Wal-Mart and Chipotle, by contrast, took 18 and 14 
years respectively. In recent years, as the cost of starting a 
technology company has continued to plummet—and as the 
ubiquity of mobile and Internet technology increases, and the 
cloud makes it fast and cheap to start a tech business—the 
speed with which asset light technology companies can hit the 
billion dollar milestone has continued to accelerate. 
Time to Reach $1B in Annual Revenue
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As the cost of starting a technology 
company has continued to 
plummet—as the ubiquity of 
mobile and Internet technology 
increases, and the cloud makes 
it fast and cheap to start a tech 
business—the speed with which 
asset light technology companies 
can hit the billion dollar milestone 
has continued to accelerate. 
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A decade ago, it was impossible to penetrate low-income market segments 
in emerging markets via asset light technology platforms. Today, the deep 
penetration of mobile networks has already sparked transformative new 
sectors and business models serving low-income segments. 
The continuous rise of the smartphone and greater mobile broadband penetration in low-income markets will blow 
open this opportunity. Some forecasts estimate that up to 70% of the world’s population will use a smartphone by 
2020 with emerging markets driving much of this growth; recent estimates predict that emerging markets will account 
for 80% of these new subscriptions.21
Asset light businesses serving LMI populations in emerging markets also have a few specific advantages that help 
them scale more quickly in challenging circumstances. First, they have a much lower need for capital overall—and 
(as outlined in section three) debt is especially both scarce and quite expensive for startups in emerging markets. 
Investors in asset light companies therefore have much less risk of dilution as the company grows. Second, poorer 
populations can be geographically spread in both rural and semi-urban areas. Technology-based applications 
(especially delivered through mobile phones) can help companies reach these customers more easily and cheaply. 
Those delivering virtual goods and services can also avoid the pitfalls of less-developed supply chains, which can 
make distribution—especially to rural areas—expensive, time consuming, and risky.  
As illustrated below, there are several promising areas in which Internet and mobile technology is making it dramatically 
easier to create asset light models that serve LMI populations. Take for example financial services. Omidyar Network’s 
analysis of mobile wallets indicates that they reduce the lifetime cost of an account by up to 85%,22 dramatically 
speeding up time to break-even compared to a brick-and-mortar bank. This allows for a much quicker and cost-efficient 
way to reach the unbanked. The same can be true for education technology. Consider for example, Open English, a 
company which provides multimedia online English instruction. Instruction is provided through live lessons over the 
course of about a year and costs an estimated $750-$1,000. Because of economies of scale through technology-based 
delivery, the company estimates this cost is about a third to a fifth of what traditional schools would charge for small 
classes or individual instruction.23 Such a reduction allows a much wider population to afford the service.
Taken together, these cost advantages of being “asset light” often (though not always) equate to the possibility 
of generating strong cash flows—if not offset by other costs, for instance customer acquisition. This cash flow 
consideration is one of the factors that typically makes an investment attractive to venture capital funds, and thus it is 
not surprising that the frontier segment does generate interest from at least some conventional VCs.
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Irrespective of cash flow considerations, these comparisons are not meant to imply that technology can or should 
replace services delivered in person. In financial services, a bank can deliver much more of a package of services in 
person than it might, to date, on a phone alone. Similarly, in education, the benefits of multifaceted in-person, cohort-
based instruction are well-documented. Nonetheless, technology is proving a powerful complement that can help open 
up new services for underserved populations who otherwise might be excluded. 
Indeed, it is noteworthy, given the relative advantages of the rapid spread of mobile technology in particular, that many 
self-identified impact investors in emerging markets are overwhelmingly invested in more capital-intensive industries 
such as agriculture, housing, and the like. All are important areas for innovation, but even in these areas it seems 
important to pay attention to the ways that the spread of technology can reduce the capital burdens of such models. 
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Liquidity
Liquidity is an important factor (exogenous to any particular business model) that influences where 
early stage investing works for LMI populations. This is particularly true because IPOs, already scarce 
in the US, are almost non-existent in emerging markets outside of China (influenced in large part 
by lesser-developed stock markets). For example, in 2014, companies from Africa and Latin America 
combined represented less than 2% of global IPOs. 
The vast majority of global exits (85%) are acquisitions—and here we are seeing more promise for 
frontier investors via a greater and growing geographic spread of buyouts.
Many of the deals in the graph below were not originally venture-backed companies. However, most 
of these countries, not surprisingly, are where venture investors are already active. More developed 
capital markets bode well for venture investing, as well as for frontier investing specifically. 
Source: EMPEA 2014
Emerging Market Private 
Equity Deals at the Growth 
and Buyout Stage in 2014
Page 21
Near-Term Opportunities in the Frontier
As technology, particularly mobile, spreads quickly, it becomes more and more possible to build scalable high-growth 
businesses serving lower-income segments, especially the aspiring middle class. Below, for illustration purposes, 
we lay out a few promising sectors that are ripe for further innovation and investment and which lend themselves 
to the quick scale and margins needed for traditional venture capital portfolio economics. All of these sectors have 
tremendous business and impact potential; we would encourage investors of all stripes, from traditional VCs to 
impact investors and beyond, to look more carefully at these and similar opportunities. They represent the next 
frontier for venture capital in emerging markets. 
We believe the following sectors represent the next frontier for 
venture capital in emerging markets. Quick scale afforded by the 
spread of technology makes these sectors promising.
Financial Technology 
(fintech)
Education Technology 
(edtech)
Consumer Internet and Mobile
$
$
A+
FINTECH
Technology is transforming the financial services 
sector. Disruptive startups are forgoing brick-
and-mortar bank branches to deliver cost-effective financial 
services to the billions of unbanked in emerging markets 
via mobile and Internet platforms. Financial services are 
transformative for low-income segments,24 empowering them 
to build assets, invest in a better future, and endure economic 
shocks that frequently thrust the unbanked back into poverty. 
Mobile money was one of the first innovations in this domain 
to gain traction. By the end of 2014, 21 mobile money services 
had more than 1 million 90-day active accounts, and five of 
these services had over 5 million active accounts. Out of the 
21 services, two were based in West Africa, a region where 
the number of mobile money accounts has had rapid recent 
increases—from 5.7 million in December 2013 to 8.9 million in 
December 2014.25
$
$ Financial services are 
transformative for low-income 
segments, empowering them to 
build assets, invest in a better 
future, and endure economic 
shocks that frequently thrust the 
unbanked back into poverty.
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Building on the success of mobile money and mobile payments, startups are harnessing the same trends to disrupt 
a broader set of financial services that includes: insurance, consumer loans, personal financial management, and 
beyond. For example, MicroEnsure partners with telecom operators to sell affordable life and health insurance to 
15M+ low-income consumers across 16 countries in Africa and Asia and expects to reach 26 million in 2018. The 
disruptive potential of MicroEnsure attracted investment from two major global insurance companies (AXA and 
Sanlam) with a combined market cap exceeding $55 billion.
Another promising area is that of remittances. Every year a large sum of money is sent from immigrants in developed 
countries to relatives and friends in emerging economies. In 2014 this figure was estimated to be north of $435 
billion, far exceeding total development assistance flows globally. Technology is reducing transaction costs for 
these payments, enabling more to go to intended recipients. Xoom Corporation, one of the market leaders, allows 
consumers to send money, pay bills, and reload mobile phones from the United States to 33 countries, including 
China, India, Pakistan, Mexico, and the Philippines. The company was initially backed by venture firms including 
Sequoia Capital, New Enterprise Associates, SVB Capital, and Fidelity Ventures. It later went public—and in 2015, 
PayPal announced its intent to acquire the firm. The success of companies like Xoom has inspired the growth of other 
venture-backed remittance companies, including Azimo, TransferWise, and WorldRemit. Moreover, mobile money 
operators in emerging markets are increasingly providing regional remittance transfer offerings across their different 
markets, including Tigo, Orange, and Airtel—circumventing the traditional, often cash-based transfer programs.
EDTECH
Technology is also fueling a revolution in how students learn. Digital tools for assessment, performance 
data analysis, and adaptive learning platforms are making it possible to tailor content for individual 
students, and to increase access to services not available to poorer learners. Despite the unique challenges of a 
market dominated by the public sector, the emerging edtech industry is picking up steam. Edtech firms in the US 
secured a record $1.25 billion in investments in 2013, in recognition of a market projected to be three-quarters of a 
trillion dollars just for the US K-12.26 Though it is still early days for edtech in emerging markets, the market potential 
is equally compelling—and worth more attention from VCs. The potential economic impact of technology to improve 
A+
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educational outcomes is large and widespread. If technology is adopted in India’s schools, colleges, and vocational 
training institutes along the themes outlined above, some reports have estimated that the incremental economic 
impact could be $60 billion to $90 billion per year by 2025.27
Early edtech ventures are posting impressive scale, returns, and impact. In Brazil, an asset light model has enabled 
the rapid growth for Geekie. Since it was founded in 2011, Geekie has delivered its proprietary adaptive learning 
platform (which customizes learning content and format to the individual needs of each student) to over 3 million low- 
and middle-income students in more than 7,000 schools. Its personalized learning platform aims to enhance high 
school performance, measured annually by the Brazilian national exam that determines access to public universities. 
The majority of students that have used the Geekie platform are lower income and study in public schools, which 
have to date provided little to no access to personalized learning tools. There is preliminary evidence that these 
tools improve learning opportunities and results. Much of Geekie’s scale is attributable to the low distribution 
costs enabled by its tech-based delivery model, which combines cloud-based computing with browser and mobile 
interfaces to maximize its reach. 
Or consider Siyavula, a South African education technology company that enables learners to improve their 
performance in high school mathematics and science through technology-powered learning. Siyavula’s software 
adapts intelligently to every learner’s individual needs, providing targeted feedback especially to those who are 
struggling, so that they can master the necessary concepts and skills. Learners using Siyavula’s online programs 
have completed 5 million exercises to date, generating promising learning gains in a short period of time. Siyavula has 
also developed openly licensed, curriculum-aligned textbooks for math and science. This content is freely accessible 
to read and download online or over mobile, through an 
innovative partnership with the Department of Basic Education 
and Vodacom. Such a mix of technology-delivered services and 
partnerships is already demonstrating the potential to improve 
learning outcomes and increase access. Technology is also fueling a 
revolution in how students learn. 
Digital tools for assessment, 
performance data analysis, and 
adaptive learning platforms are 
making it possible to tailor content 
for individual students, and to 
increase access to services not 
available to poorer learners. 
Page 24
CONSUMER INTERNET AND MOBILE
Information is power—whether it be access to health information, agriculture prices, or the news. The 
rapid spread of mobile technology (and smartphones in particular) creates promising openings for 
innovation on behalf of lower-income populations. Of course, “mobile for development” is not a new idea; what is 
potentially under-leveraged are commercial mass-market mobile platforms that have disproportionate benefit for 
lower-income groups.
Consider Dailyhunt (formerly Newshunt), a mobile app in India that delivers news in native languages like Telugu, 
Marathi, Hindi, or Gujarati. Since its founding in 2009, Dailyhunt has been installed over 100 million times, reaching 
customers both urban and rural—reaching far beyond the English-educated urban elite and into the lower-middle-
income groups and beyond. Because there are low incremental costs for each additional install, Dailyhunt has been 
able to focus more of its resources on building out content, further strengthening the value proposition of the app for 
consumers. Access to news and information is a critical input to a democratic society; companies like Dailyhunt are 
well-positioned to make critical information much more widely available. 
A number of more recent startups are also worth mentioning. For example, Jugnoo (which just raised its series A) is 
pioneering the model of on-demand auto-rickshaw services. This innovative departure from on-demand taxis has 
the potential to make transportation more accessible to LMI populations (who are more likely to use rickshaws given 
the lower price point) while also increasing employment opportunities. A related business is ClickBus in Brazil, which 
aims to move some of the $3.4B market for local and regional bus tickets online via an app.28 ClickBus aggregates 
bus travel information and enables users to buy tickets to over 3,000 destinations in Brazil. Prices are set by the bus 
companies themselves, since fares are regulated under Brazilian law. More recently ClickBus expanded into Mexico, 
Colombia, and Turkey. 
Meanwhile, Zimmber, a seed stage business, is launching  
an on-demand home services model—from handymen to 
cleaning and exterminators. While it is still early days for  
on-demand home services globally, Zimmber also holds 
promise of increasing both employment and service access  
for LMI populations.
Given such promising companies and the rapid spread of  
both basic and smartphones, it is surprising that we don’t  
see more explicit emphasis from impact investors on mass 
market consumer Internet and mobile applications that benefit 
poorer populations. 
The rapid spread of mobile 
technology and smartphones 
in particular creates promising 
openings for innovation 
on behalf of lower-income 
populations. Of course, “mobile 
for development” is not a new 
idea; what is potentially under-
leveraged are commercial mass-
market mobile platforms that 
have disproportionate benefit 
for lower-income groups.
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In the last section, we outlined the frontier segment, where we believe  
there is an under-tapped opportunity to use the traditional venture capital 
model to spur innovation for low- and lower-middle-income consumers in 
emerging markets. How, then, should we think about companies that don’t 
meet these criteria—companies with unproven business models that may 
also be more asset intensive, target exclusively lower-income consumers, or 
operate in geographies where exits might be particularly challenging (or all  
of the above)? 
On the one hand, this domain, which we call “frontier plus,” is clearly not for the faint of heart. Startups that target 
exclusively low-income populations are often going after harder-to-reach markets with lower individual purchasing 
power, making exponential growth less likely and margins more difficult. Similarly, highly asset-intensive businesses 
may be able to achieve rapid growth, but it is less probable that they would achieve the kind of home run returns 
necessary for many VCs’ portfolio economics, especially given the scarcity and cost of capital available for companies 
in emerging markets. Compound the above with the uncertainty of unproven business models, and the risks overall in 
this domain seem quite high. Indeed, given the newness of these business models, it is difficult to distinguish between 
those that have strong commercial promise (and just may need, for example, more creative financing), and those where 
investors may not be fully compensated for the risks they take in conventional VC time horizons. We would posit that 
the more of these aforementioned challenges that a business takes on (asset intensity, etc.), the greater the pressure 
to get things absolutely right and still be able to meet the timeline and scale expectations of traditional VC funding. 
Companies in this domain have far less room to test and pivot. 
3  Frontier Plus
On the other hand, there are several reasons to take seriously frontier plus businesses, from both a financial 
and impact perspective. First, there are already a number of promising businesses operating in this segment, 
and attracting financing. Some, like Servals Automation—which sells efficient cookstoves to low-income Indian 
households, are in the manufacturing and retail sales business but still have provided excellent performance. 
Aavishkaar realized a 65% IRR. Others have yet to exit but are aiming at basic needs in unconventional ways. 
D.light, which delivers affordable solar energy solutions for homes and businesses in the developing world (and 
aims to eradicate the kerosene lantern), has sold over 10 million solar lanterns and solar home systems, touching 
an estimated 50 million lives. The company, which has products in 62 countries and operates from 10 field offices 
and four international hubs, has achieved an 84% market share in the entry-level solar lantern category according to 
Lighting Global.29
Swarna Pragati is an Indian lender that offers housing finance 
to rural families in conjunction with other partner MFIs—a 
business model that is not at all proven in rural areas.30 Loans 
range from about $700 to about $1,400 each, much smaller 
than even urban Indian housing finance loans. Terms are 36-48 
months, and matched to “progressive builds” or incremental 
builds by the customer. Also operating in rural India, EM3 Agri, 
an Aspada investee, offers farmer productivity services to 
smallholder farmers to help them improve productivity by over 
20%. Instead of selling farmers capital equipment like tractors, 
or other implements, EM3 sells a comprehensive service of a 
John Deere tractor and a driver to professionally manage tilling, 
planting, and other services. While many of these models are 
early stage, the fact that there have been exits—like Servals—
suggests that there is opportunity here for those with the 
appetite for the risk and the patience to see it through.
We have seen several exits  
of companies in the frontier  
plus segment. Companies  
such as Rangsutra (consumer 
crafts), Servals Automation 
(efficient cookstoves), Shree 
Kamdhenu Electronics 
(electronic milk collection 
services), and RuralShores (rural 
business process outsourcing) 
produced 5x or greater returns 
to investors. 
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More important is the question of impact. Indeed, many companies in this 
space are pioneering business models that may have transformative potential 
for LMI populations—in critical sectors spanning agriculture to healthcare 
and beyond. 
Importantly, certain industries that do not start out as “VC ready” have shown themselves to become so over time. 
We saw this clearly with biotech investing, which in its early days had 2x-3x return on investments, rather than 
exceptional “unicorn” exits and IPOs. Over time, those economics changed and more companies with exponential 
growth emerged.31 We also saw this clearly with microfinance, which became commercial enough for VC investments 
once enough examples of success were in the market. This point is significant because it means that investors 
who work in the riskier parts of the frontier may be in some cases opening up new industry sectors for venture 
investment—and may themselves be in a better position to benefit from their boldness than those who follow on later.
Finally, and building on the former point, it’s also possible that companies in this domain may have certain 
advantages that could partially counterbalance some of the challenges. For example, some would argue that 
such investments are subject to less of a “winner-take-all” market dynamic that is common in VC—given that they 
operate in slightly less-competitive domains with longer timelines to scale. Portfolios in this domain may thus exhibit 
fewer complete losses, providing something of a counterbalance to the expectation of fewer home runs. We would 
emphasize that this argument is still speculative and not (to our knowledge) based on rigorous data. 
Taken together, the analysis above leads to several conclusions. First, pushing boundaries requires leadership—
investors and entrepreneurs who are willing to operate in highly risky areas. The frontier plus area is one that plays 
uniquely to the strengths and mission alignment of impact investors and their LPs (including DFIs, aid agencies, and 
religious institutions). We encourage these groups to invest more, and more creatively, in this domain.
Second, it does not seem wise to rely exclusively on the traditional venture capital model when financing frontier 
plus businesses. The section below captures a few highlights from a review of financing innovations in this domain—
with three particular types of financing and structuring seeming especially important for companies pushing out 
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the frontier. All of these developments are in early days and far more experimentation is needed, but many are quite 
promising. Indeed, while there does not yet appear to be a formula as clear as traditional venture capital to address 
this category of businesses, risk capital still has a critical role to play here.
What is certain, however, is that venture capital is not the only type of risk capital, or the singular formula for success. 
Indeed, we should remind ourselves that it was only in the 1980s that venture capital itself became accepted as a 
mainstream financing model worthy of institutional investment, and only in even more recent decades that venture 
debt itself became mainstream. What’s more, the early days of venture capital were arguably more risk tolerant and 
patient than today’s practices. For example, Georges Doriot (widely known as the father of venture capital), was 
famously patient in his investments, with many companies going over 10 years without exits.32
A. Longer Time Horizons
While it may be counterintuitive, there is in some cases an economic argument for patience—in the form of a 
promising return premium for not forcing an early exit. Of course, this calculus is complex, since every additional year 
of holding also exerts downward pressure on IRR but may also significantly increase the absolute amount of the gain 
as the disruptive model grows in size and footprint. We are beginning to see fund managers adjust their time horizons 
to be in line with longer maturation cycles. This, for example, is the thesis of the IGNIA Fund in Mexico, which invests 
across the three frontier segments, and has a 12-15 year fund lifecycle (as opposed to the usual 8-10).
While it may be counterintuitive, 
there is in some cases an 
economic argument for 
patience—in the form of a 
promising return premium for  
not forcing an early exit. Of 
course, this calculus is complex, 
since every additional year of 
holding also exerts downward 
pressure on IRR. Nonetheless, 
we are beginning to see fund 
managers adjust their time 
horizons to be in line with  
longer maturation cycles. 
In a similar vein, we are also seeing experimentation with holding companies (a practice that is already mainstream 
in conventional investing circles, primarily for tax reasons). In the last year, several established investors in emerging 
markets have told us about plans to set up holding companies or evergreen vehicles for their next funds, motivated 
by the mismatch between time constraints of traditional VC and PE funds and the needs of the markets in which they 
are investing. Aspada similarly decided on a hold co-structure after running a previous fund (SONG). Kartik Srivatsa 
of Aspada explained his rationale as follows:
“ Since we are investing in brick-and-mortar assets that have strong growth potential and generate high 
cash flow over time, we want the flexibility to hold onto these companies for … 15-20 years rather than 
having to sell them early. Thus, between the regular cash flows and eventual exit we can get a good year-
on-year return, which is difficult to obtain if we exit quickly.”33
Of course, the holding company model and extended time horizons are still experimental, and may only be 
appropriate for a sub-segment of frontier plus businesses. For example, while Aspada’s investments aren’t typical 
tech VC deals, they also avoid many that are extremely capital intensive (eschewing for example, companies that 
need real estate investments to succeed), and have investments in several that turn usual capital expenditure needs 
into service-based businesses instead. Given the long-term bets in these companies, they also hold entrepreneurs up 
to an even higher bar of diligence, looking for strong execution skills and stamina—as well as openness to releasing 
relatively significant stakes in their companies (often in the 25 to 30% range).  
We would emphasize time horizons are an area in which we encourage LPs to think more creatively. We know several 
experienced fund managers with excellent track records who approached their investor base about doing longer-
dated funds. They received pushback, which often had little to do with returns expectations and more to do with 
a resistance to nontraditional structures. Such resistance may come at the cost of both impact and returns in the 
frontier plus domain.
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B. Venture Debt
Frontier and frontier plus entrepreneurs often face a dearth of options for affordable debt. Startups in these markets 
generally face a brick wall on credit with more traditional banks—which sometimes turn them down for lack of 
collateral or track record, or offer them extremely high interest rates. Of course, venture debt is often a desirable 
option for startups because it does not require a company to have the same kind of established track record. But this 
too is in short supply. In mature markets such as the US, venture debt is almost 10% of the venture equity ecosystem. 
But in India, for example, one source estimated that venture debt in 2013 was only 3-3.5% of the venture equity 
market.34 This problem is particularly acute for businesses with large working capital needs, which are sometimes 
forced to take on additional equity in the place of debt, thus diluting investor returns. 
In the last few years we have been heartened to see innovations to increase availability of venture debt to frontier 
and frontier plus businesses, particularly in the Indian context. For example, IntelleGrow, launched in 2010 in India, 
replaces the collateral debt model with payments tied to cash flows. This model allows early stage businesses, 
generally less than three years old, and generally without either collateral or established track record of profitability—
to access debt more affordably. IntelleGrow has supported 80 businesses with $42 million of debt funding. More 
recently, we are excited to see players such as SIDBI begin providing uncollateralized venture debt in India. 
It is particularly urgent to develop similar venture debt solutions, particularly in emerging markets outside of India. 
Of course, doing so affordably is a challenge, given extra costs that come from factors like currency hedging and 
perceived risk. Local sources of funding for venture debt may also help lower costs since they have less need to 
factor in hedging for currency exchange risk.
This may be a place where a discrete, time-bound commitment to loan guarantees from philanthropic and aid 
sources could significantly accelerate the field. Programs such as the development credit authority at USAID and 
guarantees by groups like IFC and OPIC have brought substantial additional private debt into promising emerging 
markets startups. Concentrating similar resources to build out a more concerted venture debt ecosystem could make 
a world of difference.
Frontier plus entrepreneurs 
often face a dearth of options for 
affordable debt. Startups in these 
markets generally face a brick wall 
on credit with more traditional 
banks—which sometimes turn 
them down for lack of collateral 
or track record, or offer them 
extremely high interest rates. 
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C. Quasi-Equity
Quasi-equity is also a promising tool that may ameliorate 
several challenges common to frontier plus startups. Given 
difficulties with exits in many emerging markets, quasi-equity 
can offer investors a less risky form of liquidity. Further, 
because payouts are tied to the success of the company, 
quasi-equity may align incentives with entrepreneurs more 
than typical debt instruments while still compensating 
investors for risk. 
The most common form of quasi-equity used for these 
purposes is typically based on a percentage of company 
revenues (also known as the “royalty” model). For example, 
Lundin Foundation (which invests in sectors such as 
agriculture, energy access, and financial inclusion in emerging 
markets) uses quasi-equity structures frequently. MEDEEM 
is an early stage company that has developed an affordable, 
accessible land rights documentation process, currently being 
deployed in Ghana. Following discussions with MEDEEM’s 
senior management, Lundin provided a subordinate, low-interest loan with a sliding-scale royalty and return capped 
to the earlier of the achievement of its target IRR or 10 years. A three-year grace period was provided to allow 
sufficient runway for the company to become cash-flow positive. 
This structure ameliorates several challenges for investors at the frontier—it negates the need for prolonged debate 
over valuations based on unproven DCF assumptions; it is straightforward to validate/audit results; it offers gradual 
exits aligned with cash flows; and it provides exposure to equity-like upside. For entrepreneurs, it offers management 
the opportunity to avoid premature dilution and planning for a liquidity event, and incentivizes growth over cost 
control to achieve scale and profitability. 
We are also beginning to see more quasi-equity structures that tie payouts to something other than top-line revenue. 
For example, the demand dividend model ties variable payments to free cash flow, with a fixed payoff amount. It also 
includes a honeymoon period of one-to-three years to allow capital to get to work. (The most cited example is Eleos’ 
$200k investment in Maya Mountain Cacao, for which they expect a roughly 2x return in 4-6 years.) This model is 
interesting because, as opposed to straight royalties, it is much more tied to the entrepreneur’s ability to pay—but of 
course, there is inherent risk that companies can make their cash flow look much worse than it is if they wish to delay 
repayment. 
The demand dividend is arguably best for companies that are beyond the proof of concept stage and “have a 
reasonable line of sight to positive cash flow.” But we are also seeing similar (non-revenue based) experiments with 
much earlier stage companies, and not just in emerging markets. For example, indie.VC does seed stage quasi-
equity, tying payouts to the amount an entrepreneur pays herself in salary (compared to average salary in the area 
she is located in). O’Reilly AlphaTech Ventures (OATV) decided to create indie.VC in the US precisely to learn more 
about underserved sections of the startup market that could still be quite successful but where entrepreneurs 
themselves had no desire for a traditional exit. We are also seeing accelerators such as Fledge and Village Capital 
use quasi-equity with very early stage companies. Much more experimentation in this regard is needed—but the 
overall trend, we feel, is promising.
Quasi-equity is also a promising 
tool that may ameliorate several 
challenges common to frontier plus 
startups. Given difficulties with exits 
in many emerging markets, quasi-
equity can offer investors a less risky 
form of liquidity. The most common 
form of quasi-equity used for these 
purposes is typically based on a 
percentage of company revenues.
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We stand before unprecedented opportunity to use early stage risk capital 
to transform the opportunity set for a generation of low- and lower-middle-
income populations across developing economies, while simultaneously 
creating new sectors and contributing to the economy. 
This opportunity is largely made possible by ongoing demographic and economic shifts, such as the dramatic 
spread of mobile technology to the massive flow of private capital to emerging markets. The array of new business 
opportunities is inspiringly diverse—from tech-based assessment tools that enable underserved learners to prepare 
for higher education to new forms of housing finance that enable poorer workers without formal employment to 
finance a property purchase for the first time. And although levels of entrepreneurial activity and firm startups have 
leveled off or dropped in the US,35 levels of entrepreneurship are rising in emerging markets.36
What we really need are pioneers—leaders who are willing to take risk, to embrace the frontier by investing in 
entrepreneurs in new markets with innovative business models that can have tremendous social impact as well as 
financial return.
A Call to Action
Several important opportunities and calls to action follow from the analysis pursued in this report. 
•  Impact investors (including those who finance many funds as LPs—e.g., development finance 
institutions, financial institutions, foundations, and religious groups) have a unique role to play in both 
the frontier and frontier plus segments, where appetite for impact and risk tolerance is unlocking and 
accelerating promising new business models. We encourage impact investors to consider a broader 
spectrum of asset light, mixed-income companies. Equally, we would recommend experimenting with 
innovations in financing structures for riskier business models and sectors that may not yet be suitable 
for traditional venture capital, helping to prove these innovations for more traditional investors.
•  For venture capitalists, there are under-tapped opportunities, particularly in the “frontier” domain—
with asset light, mixed-income business models. Given the continued promise of large aspiring middle 
class populations entering the formal economies, we believe that this segment represents the future of 
emerging markets VC, and offers investors the promise of both strong commercial and social returns. 
We urge VCs to go beyond the comfort of tested models to these exciting new businesses in areas 
such as fintech and edtech.
•  In recent years, we have also seen tremendous interest from high net worth individuals—often 
self-made entrepreneurs and businesspeople—who wish to use market-based tools to create impact. 
Leadership from this group is strongly needed here—across the spectrum, but in particular in the 
frontier plus area, where tolerance for risk, patience, and willingness to do things differently can open 
up game-changing and entirely new sectors. There are also meaningful opportunities to accelerate 
entrepreneurial ecosystems, which are foundational to all three frontier sectors.
Conclusion: A Call For Pioneers
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•  Governments in emerging markets have much to gain from accelerating this movement. Champions 
in government should consider extending policies that channel additional capital here, especially with 
incentives that help defray risk, as well as programs that encourage the growth of entrepreneurship.
•  And of course, entrepreneurs are the foundation for successful early stage investing. We particularly 
appeal to seasoned emerging markets entrepreneurs to look carefully at the new opportunity set 
represented by LMI populations; this is a promising domain in which new enterprises can do well 
financially and contribute deeply to society. 
To be sure, these are early days and there are still many questions to explore. Hence, in this report we began to 
delineate near-term opportunities from farther-reaching prospects to push out the borders of the frontier. In short, for 
those running more traditional closed-end VC funds, there is tremendous untapped potential in asset light businesses 
serving “mixed income” customer bases (tapping into the rising spending power, aspirations, and demand for quality 
services of the LMI segment)—in verticals such as fintech, edtech, and the like. For those who have greater risk 
tolerance or fewer constraints, the prize may be bigger yet. By taking a risk on newer business models and industries, 
we have an opportunity to de-risk entirely new sectors that can prove their commercial viability and open up worlds 
of impact and financial returns. Doing so may require being more creative with financing structures—such as longer 
holding periods or quasi-equity. We believe that both models of investing—the nearer term and the future oriented—
are extremely important.
In the early days of an industry or movement, it is healthy to have some skepticism about where things might go. To 
that end, it is worth reminding ourselves of the early days of venture capital, which itself was subject to naysayers 
who thought it was too risky to put capital into young businesses that lacked track records. But early VC leaders were 
convinced that early stage investing was a risk well worth taking. Their fortitude, determination—and yes, patience—
changed the face of entrepreneurship and innovation. 
No doubt we should be smart, and align expectations with the kinds of businesses and models that best suit different 
types of early stage investors—as we have outlined in this report. The frontier investors will do just that, and seize this 
opportunity of a generation to extend new possibilities to billions of people around the world.
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The authors thank the many individuals and organizations whose own work, 
insights, and comments greatly enriched our thinking along the way.
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